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1. SUMMARY: Petrs challenge CA 7's decision denying judicial 
immunity to a state trial judge for his action in approving the steri-
lization of a minor. 
2. FACTS: In 1971, resp's mother determined that resp, then 
a 15-year old, should be sterilized. The mother directed attorney 
Sunday, a petr here, to prepare a petition entitled "Petition to Have 
Tubal Ligation Performed on a Minor and Indemnity P.greement." The 
petition included the mother's affidavit that resp was "somewhat 
retarded," that she had begun dating and staying overnight with older 
men, without the mother's consent, and that the mother could not 
maintain a continuous obs~rvation over resp to "prevent unfortunate 
circumstances." The petition was presented to petr Judge Stump, 
an Indiana circuit court (i.e., trial level) judge, who approved 
it. Resp was then taken to a hospital (to undergo an appendect~my, 
she was told) where the tubal ligation was performed by three doc-
tors, including two petrs here. 
Two years later, resp married. Sometime thereafter, one of the 
petr doctors informed her of the ligation. Resp then brought a 
§ 1983 action against her mother, petr Sunday, petr Stump, the --hospital, and the three doctors, alleging violation of her constitu-
tional rights. She also atta~d pendent state claims for assault and 
battery and medical malpractice. Her husband asserted a pendent 
claim for loss of potential fatherhood. ! I 
I 
The DC (N.D. Ind.) (Eschback, J.) granted a motion to dismiss. --The DC reasoned that state action was necessary to the federal claims, 
that the only state action present was that of Judge Stump's in 
approving the petition, that under Indiana law Judge Stump was acting 
within his jurisdiction, and that he was therefore shielded from 
liability by the doctrine of judicial immunity. The federal claims 
were thus defeated; the pendent state claims were then dismissed for 
want of subject matter jurisdiction. 
CA 7 reversed, holding that Judge Stump had no jurisdiction to 
approve the petition (and hence no recourse to the shield of judicial 
immunity) because neither the common law nor Indiana statutes or ---- -------------------------------------------------
court decisions expressly and specifically granted jurisdiction over 
a parental petition for sterilization of a child. CA 7 also stated, -- --
in effect, that what Judge Stump did was so outrageou~ in that 
7 
it failed 'to comply with elementary principles of procedural due 
process," 552 F.2d at 176, that his action vitiated his jurisdiction. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs assert that the well-settled doctrine of 
judicial immunity is as follows: a judge is immune from liability 
for actions taken in his judicial capacity unless (1) he acted in 
the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter and 
(2) the judge knows of the lack of jurisdiction. Bradley v. Fisher, 
80 U.S. 646 (1871). Petrs then contend that Stump, as a judge of 
a court of general jurisdiction, had subject-matter jurisdiction over 
the petition. In this contention, petrs are joined by the State 
of Indiana as amicus, which points to the jurisdictional grant 
statute: Stump's state circuit court had "original exclusive juris-
diction in all cases at law and in equity whatsoever" and "juris-
diction of all other causes, matters and proceedings where exclusive 
jurisdiction thereof is not [as it was not here] conferred by law 
upon some other court, board or officer." I.e. 1971, § 33-4-4-3. 
Stump knew that he lacked jurisdiction over the resp's mother's ( 
Petrs also assert that there is absolutely no showing or finding that 
petition. 
In response, resp relies primarily on the opinion of CA 7. She 
f/1. 
also swells at some length on the outrageous nature of petrs' conduct. 
~ 
She does not, as CA 7 did not, respond to petrs' point regarding 
Stump's knowledge of his jurisdiction. 
4. DISCUSSION: Both sides argue over the significance of A.L. / ; \ 
v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975~, which held that the v 
common law did not grant to the mother of a brain-damaged boy the 
-4-
( 
power to secure the boy's sterilization. Petrs and the DC 
read this case as implying that Indiana courts have jurisdiction 
to determine such questions, while exercising that jurisdiction in A.L. 
to rule adversely to the parent. Resp and CA 7 argue ·that the case 
is a clear statement (although coming several years after Judge 
Stump's action) that Indiana courts have no jurisdiction over such 
matters. My reading of the case leads me to believe that the DC's 
interpretation is correct. /1 .tt' . ---- (. . 
More importantly, the Indiana jurisdictional grant statute appears 
sufficiently broad that Stump's action must be deemed to fall within • _________ WO" ______ ......_ --. ---------..__.. 
its scope. Further, a refusal to extend immunity to Stump appears 
entirely unwarranted in the absence of any indication that Stump 
knew that his action was beyond his jurisdiction. In shoi:t, CA 7 
erred. It quite clearly let its outrage that the whole affair occurred 
lead it to skirt the judicial immunity shield in a not entirely 
---------- ----- ----------------
principled fashion. 
But several considerations lead to the conclusion that cert 
should be denied. First, CA 7's action in reversing the dismissal 
did not finally dispose of the litigation; it only means that the 
litigation will now proceed. Although this interlocutory nature 
of theCA's judgment does not affect this Court's jurisdiction, 
it has often been viewed as an important factor militating against 
a grant of cert. Stern & Gressman § 4.19. The question may more 
appropriately be reviewed after a final judgment fixing liability. 
Such litigation may produce, for example, information on Stump's 




Second, there are institutional costs. in reviewing this 
case. This is a sordid case. If this Court grants review the case - -
will attract even wider attention and publicity than it has already 
received -- all for the wrong reasons. And regardless of how the 
Court rules on the narrow legal issue raised (judicial immunity), its 
decision, because of the underlying fact pattern, will be very sus-
ceptible to popular misunderstanding (i.e., as approving or pro-
hibiting the sterilization of children). These costs would seem 
to outweigh any benefits to be derived from plenary review of a CA 
opinion so fact-specific that its precedential value, its potential 
for mischief, is de minimus. 
There is a response. 
8/17/77 Stewart ops in petn; 
CA op also 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell Date: December 16, 1977 
From: Bob Comfort 
This case presents the question whether CA 7 misapplied 
the doctrine of judicial immunity developed in Brad~ v. ~ish~!, 
13 Wall. 335 (1871), and ~!~!SO~ v. Ray, 386 u.s. 547 (1967), 
when it held that Judge Stump's approval of respondent's tubal 
legation was outside his jurisdiction. CA 7 appears to have 
misunderstood ~~~dl~y on a number of points, so that a reversal 
is clearly indicated. 
I 
CA 7 recognized that Bradl~y v. Fisher extends judicial 
immunity to any judge with subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
L • 
case involved. It correctly stated that the immunity exists even 
when the judge acts in excess of that jurisdiction, but not where .__.. - .....__ _  _ 
there is a clear absence of jurisdiction. 
Having stated the law correctly, CA 7 proceeded to 
misunderstand its own statement. It rejected as inadequate 
petitioner's argument that he presided over a court of general 
jurisdiction, holding that immunity could only attach where the 
disputed claim is one with "a statutory or common law basis." 
Petn. at A 11. Turning first to Indiana statutes, CA 7 observed 
that Ind. Rev. Code § 16-13-13-1 provides that the superintendent 
of a state hospital may consent to the sterilization of a mental 
defective. This negates any inference that a parent might 
perform a similar function. 
Addressing next the common law, CA 7 found a similar 
lack of parental authority to consent to a child's 
sterilization. The court concluded that ~~~ v. §~~~' 325 N.E. 
2d 501 (Ind. App. 1975), decided four years after Judge Stump's 
action, undercut any claim that he had jurisdiction to consider 
respondent's claim. In A.L. v. ~g~~' the Indiana Court of 
Appeals held that the common law attributes of the parent-child 
relationship did not permit a parent to have a "dull" child 
sterilized merely to prevent possible impregnation of others. 
Nor did Judge Stump have any power to fashion new law in the 
area, for the procedure he approved violated due process and 
flouted Indiana statutes; hence, it was not validly fashioned law. 
CA 7's entire line of reasoning is incorrect. It is 
clear that ~ra~ley v. ~.!§!!~!.. distinguished between jurisdiction 
to entertain the particular sort of case involved and an 
excessive or incorrect exercise of th,at j ur isd ict ion: 
A distinction must be here observed between 
excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of 
all jurisdiction qyer the sub j ect-matter: Where 
there is clearly no j ur fs~ 1ct1on over tne 
subject-matter any authority exercised is a 
usurped authority, and for the exercise of such 
authority, when the want of jurisdiction is 
known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. 
But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter 
is invested by law in the judge, or in the court 
which he holds, the manner and extent in which 
the jurisdiction shall be exercised are 
generally as much questions for his 
determination as any other questions involved in 
the case, although upon the correctness of his 
determination in these particulars the validity 
of his judgments may depend. Thus, if a probate 
court, invested only with authority over wills 
and the settlement of estates of deceased 
persons, should proceed to try parties for 
public offences, jurisdiction over the subject 
of offences being entirely wanting in the court, 
and this being necessarily known to its judge, 
his commission would afford no protection to him 
in the exercise of the usurped authority. But 
if on the other hand a judge of a criminal 
court, invested with general criminal 
jurisdiction over offences committed within a 
certain district, should hold a particular act 
to be a public offence, which is not by the law 
made an offence, and proceed to the arrest and 
trial of a party charged with such act, or 
should sentence a party convicted to a greater 
punishment than that authorized by the law upon 
its proper construction, no personal liability 
to civil action for such acts would attach to 
the judge, although those acts would be in 
excess of his jurisdiction, or of the 
jurisdiction of the court held by him, for these 
are particulars for his judicial consideration, 
whenever his general jurisdiction over the 
subject-matter is invoked. Indeed some of the 
most difficult and embarrassing questions which 
a judicial officer is called upon to consider 
and determine relate to his jurisdiction, or 
that of the court held by him, or the manner in 
which the jurisdiction shall be exercised. And 
the same principle of exemption from liability 
which obtains for errors committed in the 
3. 
4 . 
ordinary prosecution of a suit where there is 
jurisdiction of both subject ' and person, applies 
in cases of this kind, and for the same reasons. 
13 Wall. at 351-352. This excerpt demonstrates that CA 7's 
insistence on a "statutory or common law basis" was an incorrect 
interpretation of the law. In the example given by the ~~adl~y 
Court, the criminal court judge held "a particular act to be a 
public offence, which [was] not by the law made an offence." The 
fact of jurisdiction to hear the sort of case involved provided 
immunity, even though there was no basis in law or equity for 
recognizing the prosecutor's claim. 
Judge Stump's action fits into the same category. His 
was a court of general jurisdiction, clearly having jurisdiction 
to hear the sort of case brought to it by respondent's mother. 
Indeed, A.L. v. G.R.H. makes this clear. There, the Indiana 
court entertained the parent's action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that she had the right to consent to her son's 
sterilization. The court held that the law created no such 
right, but it clearly exercised its jurisdiction to decide the 
-*I issue. Thus 
-*I Moreover, CA 7 did not advert to Indiana 
statutes, §§ 16-8-3-1 and 16-8-4-2, which permit parents to 
consent to surgery for unemancipated minor incompetents and for 
children in general. These statutes at least arguably created 
the right claimed by respondent's mother. They fairly clearly 
establish that a court of general jurisdiction could consider 
such claims. (Indeed, the court in A.L. v. G.R.H. considered 
whether under Indiana law such a rignt-existed:-)--Thus an 
additional requirement of the ~~adley test was not satisfied: 
the lack of "jurisdiction" (assuming that "jurisdiction" means CA 
7's statutory or common law basis) was not clear. 
Judge Stump, like the criminal court )udge in the ~~~~l~Y 
example, had jurisdiction over the subject matter; he was simply 
mistaken as to the rights and duties created by the law over 
which he was exercising that jurisdiction. CA 7, by adding the 
5 • 
requirement that the judge's action have some basis in common law 
or statute, made the Br~91ey test far more restrictive. Not only 
must the judge have subject matter jurisdiction, but he must be 
correct in deciding that the law establishes the particular right 
within that subject matter. 
II 
The failure to follow proper procedures and to protect 
respondent's due process rights is irrelevant. Those same 
elements were present in Br~dl~y: 
The Criminal Court of the District erred in 
not citing the plaintiff, before making the order 
striking his name from the roll of its attorneys, 
to show cause why such order should not be made 
for the [contemptible conduct] stated, and 
affording him opportunity for explanation, or 
defence, or apology. But this erroneous manner 
in which its jurisdiction was exercised, however 
it may have affected the validity of the act, did 
not make the act any less a judicial act; nor did 
it under the defendant liable to answer in 
damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as 
though the court had proceeded without having any 
jurisdiction whatever over its attorneys. 
13 Wall. at 356-357. 
It seems that CA 7 allowed its revulsion at the nature 
of the activity to warp its perception of the ~!adl~ test. By 
adding its new "statutory or common law basis" requirement, it 
has stripped away a significant degree of protection. In effect, 
it has rendered the ~~adl~Y test meaningless; under the CA 7 
' . 
test, a trial judge resolves an arguable point of law at his 
peril. Since immunity generally will be needed only in 
"revolting", or at least controversial, cases the force of the 
doctrine will have been drained entirely - assuming that even 
CA 7 would apply it outside the sterilization area. 
Respondent's brief has not yet been filed. Although I 
do not believe that it will cast CA 7's decision in a different 
light, I will supplement this memo if necessary. 
6 • 
------- ~ 
( BENCH MEMO -- UPPLEMENTAL 
Stump v. Sparkman, No. 76-1750 
FROM: Bob Comfort DATE: Dec. 19, 1977 
The respondents have filed their brief. They make 
only one argument: Judge Stump's action, in approving the 
mother's petition, was n~t a j~dicja]~ct; therefore, it 
does not fall within the scope of the Bradley-Pierson doctrine. 
They emphasize that the petition "neither constituted 
nor related to the institution of any kind of judicial 
proceeding. The petition had no case caption naming the parties 
or naming any court. No number was ever assigned to the matter. 
Indeed, no attempt was made to file or deposit these docu-
ments, or any other piece of paper, in the Clerk's Office 
of the Court on which Judge Stump sat. Nd even Judge Stump 
t', ''r 
was left with a copy of what he had signed." Resp Br. at 19. 
Since no judicial p roceeding was involved, i mply the re-
spondent-s, no judicial act could rave been involved , either . 
They proceed , how ever , to rest this argumerr in l arge 
part upon the absence of p r oc edural due process (notice and 
opportunity to responq. As pointed out in the bench memo, 
failure to adhere to due process requirements does not 
divest the act ion of its judicial character. Thus , r e-
spondents ' argument re a lly boils down to a claim that 
because Judge Stump acted through a procedure not clearly 
recognized at Indiana law, his action was non-judicial. 
It would seem that resort to unorthodox procedures should 
no more divest the act of its judicial qua lity than faiure 
to accord the litigants the required process. In each instance , 
the judge is simply following inappropriate procedures. Indeed, 
in the se.cond instance, the primary complaint seems to be 
that due process was violated. Yet here Judge Stump was 
acting in a n area over which he did have subject matter 
jurisdiction. His approval of the petition could be .. 
analogized ·to the grant of declaratory judgment unsuccess-
fully sought in A.L. v. G.R.H. Since he had jurisdiction 
over the general area, it should not maWer that he erred 
in procedural respects any more than that he erred in the 
law. 
If, as respondents claim, Judge Stump's act was purely 
that of a p rivate citizen, there would have been no point 
in submitting the petition to hirrn in the first place. He 
and the petitioner (mother) obviously thought that a ju-
Jfcr/ !i 7:-d-o, 
dicial ratification of the procedure was being effected. 
A 
Since the ratification was sought and obtained in an 
area over which the judge had jurisdiction, neither pro-
-3-
cadural nor substantive errors should strip away in~unity. 
Indeed, if the act was purely a private one, wi~, 
no claim to judicial authority, respondents may be out of 
court. One would think that a holding for them on that 
ground would support a strong argument to the effect that 
there was no state action below. Respondents might then 
be ·free to pursue a state tort remedy against the Judge 
and private defendants, but it would seem that their federal 
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No. 76-1750 STUMP v. SPARKMAN 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
While I join the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice 
Stewart, I wish to emphasize what I take to be a central 
feature of this case -petitioner's preclusion of any 
possibility for the vindication of respondent's rights 
through appeal. 
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), which 
established the absolute judicial immunity at issue in this 
case, recognized that the immunity was designed to further 
the public interest in an independent judiciary, sometimes 
at the expense of legitimate individual grievances. Id., 
at 349; accord, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 
The Bradley Court accepted those costs to aggrieved 
individuals because the judicial system itself provided 
other means for protecting individual rights: 
"Against the consequences of [judges'] erroneous 
or irregular action, from whatever motives 
proceeding, the law has provided for private 
parties numerous remedies, and to those remedies 
they must, in such cases, resort." Bradley, 
supra, at 354. 
Underlying the Bradley, immunity then, is the notion that 
private rights can be sacrificed in some degree to the 
achievement of the greater public good deriving from 
judicial immunity because of the existence of alternative 
methods for vindicating those rights. Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-428 (1976). 
Primary among those methods is the right of 
appeal, which permits the correction of errors otherwise 
shielded fr~m attack by judicial immunity. See Pierson v. 
Ray, supra. Where a judicial officer acts so as to 
preclude all resort to appellate remedies, the underlying 
assumption of the Bradley doctrine is inoperative. If the 
Bradley immunity is permitted to operate in those 
circumstances, there never will be any opportunity for the 
vindication of individual rights. To label as a "judicial 
act" such an absolute deprivation of the very safeguards 
the judicial system offers each individual verges on a 
contradiction in terms. 
2. 
In this case, as Mr. Justice Stewart points out, 
ante at 5, petitioner's irresponsible actions insured that 
"[t]here was and could be no appeal." For that reason, I 
would hold that his actions were not "judicial" and that he 
is not immune from suit under 42 u.s.c. § 1983. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. See Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege 
in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 
74 Harv. L. Rev. 44, 53-55 (1960); Jaffe, Suits Against 
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 
209, 233-235 (1963); Note, Federal Executive Immunity From 
Civil Liability in Damages: A Reevaluation of Barr v. 
Mateo, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 625, 647 (1977). 
2. In both Bradley and Pierson any errors 
committed by the judges involved were open to correction on 
appeal. 
CHAMeERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~npt"tmt <!fourt of tqt ~ttittb ~taits 
11JasJrington. ~. <!f. 211.?'~~ 
January 16, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-1750, Stump v. Sparkman 
I vote to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I 
cannot find, under all the circumstances of this case, that the 
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From: Mr. Jus t i ce White 
Circulated: cel-/6- z£ 
Recirculated: -------
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 76- 1750 
Harold D. Stun1 p ct a. I., Peti. tiOIJ<'rs, l 011 \V rit of C'cr.ti01·ari to 
1J. the (! 11itcd Sta.trs 
Linda Kay Sparktnan and Court of App<·als for 
Leo SparknHUI. the Seventh Circuit. S -1:4 
{February -, 1978] ~ . 
MR. Jusnc1·: WHITE clrliverrcl the opinion of thr Court. 
This casr requires us to consider the SC'OJH' of a judge ·s 
immunity from damages liability when sued under 42 U.S. C. 
§ 1983. 
I 
The re]rvant facts underlying respondents' suit arC' not in 
dispute. On July D. 1071. Ora Spitler Me.Farlin. tlw mother 
of respondent Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman , prPsen t(•d to 
Judge Harold D. Stump of the Circuit Court of D('Kalh 
County. [nd .. a document caption<'<! "Petition To Hav<' Tubal 
Ligation PNformed On Minor and Indemnity AgT('(•nwnt. " 
T'he cloetunent had h<'<'ll draftPd by lwr attorney. a petition<'!' 
here. l11 this petition Mrs. McFarlin stat<>d lllld('f' oath that 
her dau~hter was 15 y<'ars of agf' and was "sonwwhat rdarded .'' 
although she attended public school and had lw<•n promot<'rl 
each y<'ar with h<'r elass. The petition further statC'd that 
Linda had brt'll associating with "oldt'r youth or youn~ nwn "' 
and had stayc•d out ow'rnight. with them 011 SC'V<'ral oecasions. 
As a l'<'SUlt of this lwhavior and Linda's mental eapahilitiC's. iL 
was stated that it would be in the daugh trr ·i'i h(•st i 11 teresi if 
shr UIHkrwent a tubal ligatiorr in order " to prP\.('Ilt Lmfortunaic 
circumstances . .. . " In the satn(' doeunwnt Mrs. 1\l[eFarlin 
also undertook to indemnify and hold harmlcsf' Dr. John 
Hines, who was to perform the OJWration , and tlw Dd(alh 
76-li 50-0P.TXJON 
2 STUJ\TP 1• . SP.\ nTOIAN 
Mrmorial Hospital. wh(·re the operation \\'as to takr placr. 
against all causes of action that might aris<• as a rPsult of the 
performancr of the tuhalligation.1 
Thr pe-tition \\'as apwovcd by Judge ~t utn p o 11 tlw ;;a Ill<' 
day. He affixc•d his signatur(' as ".Judg<·. ])pKalh C'in·uit 
Court.'' to the statenwnt. that he did "hPn'l>y approv(• the 
ahoV0 P<~tition by affidavit form 011 lwhalf of Ora Spitl<•r 
McFarlin. to have Tubal Ligatiotl twrformrd upon hC'r tninor 
1 Tlw full tc;\1 of thr prti(ion ]JI'r~rnl·rd to .Tndgr Slump 1'1':1<1 :t>' follrnw: 
"S•rA'I'g OF 1 NDfANA } 
~~· 
CouNTY oF DEl(ArJn · · • 
" PETITTO:\" TO H.-\YE TrTt\L UCATlOX I'EHFOH\TFD 0~ 
MTXOH AXD 1'\DL\'fXTTY ACH EE\TE:\T 
"Orn Rpitlrr \I<'F:trlnnd. h<·ing dnl~· ~wom npon lwr o:dlt "!:11!':< ihn( :<hr 
iR thr nrdnr:tl mothrr of nnd hn" f'lt,..:lod~· of hN d:111ghiN. Lindn 1-:pill(',l', :1gc 
:fiflr<•n (15) bring born .l:lllll:lr~ · 2~, 1951i :111d snid dn11ght<•r l'<'"id1·:< with 
]wr nt. lOS Two Rtrrrt. Anhnrn , Dd(:dh Count~·. Tndi:~n:1. 
"Arfi:ml' ;.;lnfp,; thai hn d:1111-.dtl<·r'.• lll('nl:dit.'· i" .•11c·h tlwl .•lw i.• ron,;id<•n•<l 
to hr "onwwh:d· n•l:ll'(lrd :tllhn11gh ,;Jw i.• :~ll<·tHiin:..r nr h:1.• :lifc•tHI<•d file 
puhlic ,.;rhool:< in DeK:dh Crnl rnl ~c·hool R~·,.;l('m <~nd h"' ht>c•n p:t.-.:~rd :!long 
with oihPr rhildr!'n in lwr :lgr Jr,·rl r1·rn though "he• dew~ not ha1·r ll'hnl i>' 
ron~idrred nnrm:d mc•nl:d r:1p:d•ilitir" and inf<·lligrn<·<•. Fnrl'lwr, thn1 ~<~i<l 
affi:~nt . h:1~ h;1cl prohlc·m~ in the hnnw of ~:1icl <·hild :1.• :1 n'.•ult of .•:1icl 
d:l ught N }p;~ ,·ing I hf' hnnw on ~1'\'N:d orcn .•ion.-.: to :1.•:<1H'i:li 1' ll'i ( h olckr 
~ ·nnth or ~ ·oung m<·n :111d :1~ :1 mnff!'l' of f:1f'l h:wing :<l:~~wl ovl'l'nighl with 
:-:aid youth or nwn nne! :1ho1il whic·h inc·idrnf,; .•:1id :dlinnl did not hc•<·ouw 
nwnt'<' of nutil :1ffc•r ~nl'h inc·id('nl,; oc·c·Jtnwl. A.• :1 rc ·,.;nll· of lhi .• hc•li:ll ·ior 
nnd tlw nwntal c·:1pnhilifiP:< of .•aid d:1Ughlc•r , affiant belic·,·c•,, lh:lf it i,.; io lh(' 
bP"I inlrr<·~l of,;;~ id C'hild 111:11 :I T11h:d Lignl iou hr. pt>rforn1c ·d on .•: I id minor 
cl:tnghtc•r to Jll'C'\·c•nt· unforlun:ilc ' c·in'llll1.•1:111C'f'." lo orc·1tr :111cl :< ill<'l' it i.• 
impo~,.;ihlr for thr :10i:1nl :1,.; mnthPr of ~aid minor c•hild io n1:1tnt :11n and 
ronlrol :1 <·mt\inuou» nh~<·n·:tlion of thr :t<'fiYifir,.; of :-a id d:tughl<·r <':t!'h ancl 
('\'('!'~' d:l~'· 
"S: tid :tffi:ntt clor.-' hrn·h~· in con.•idl'!'nfion of thr Co11rf of ih1• D!'!~alh 
C'irruit C'omt :1ppro\·ing tllf' Tubal Lig:1tion lH'ing p<'rforntPd ltJlOil h1't' 
minor danghfrr doc•,; hrrf'b1· I'OI '<'nanf and agn•c• to ind<'tnnif~ · :1111l k<'I'Jl 
iud!•mnifirrl :111d hold Dr. Joint Hinr:< , Anhurn , Indi:~n : 1 , who ,.;nid :dli:1nl i.• 
rrqnr,.;fing pPrfonn ,.;;1id op<·r:liion :~nd lh!' D1•T\alh \lernorial Jlo,.;pil:d. 
Auburn, Indiana , wher<'a» ~a id OJll'l'<~tion ll'ill be perfornwd , h:ll'llli!'.-" from 
0 • 
7u- li.>O-OPI:\l0\T 
STC.\ll' 1• . ~PAHl\;\I.\~ 
daughtrr. LiiHia Rpitlr1·. suh.kct to said Ora :-;pitkr ~JcFarlin 
CO\'C'nanting and agrPPing to indt>mnify and k('('Jl indc'lllllifird 
Dr. John HinPs and the DeKalh YlC'morial Hospital from a11y 
mattf'rs or causrs of artio11 arising tlwrdrom.' ' 
On July 15. 1fl71. Linda Rparkma11 c•nkn•d the• J)d(alb 
:Mc•morial HoRpital. ha,·i11g hrrn told that Rlw was to haY<' lwr 
apprnclix rrmovrd. Tlw following day a tubal ligaticm ,,·as 
performed upon lwr. Rh r \\'as n• lrasc•d S<'\'Pra l days later, 
una\\·arc of the tnw naturr of hc•r surg<'ry. 
Approxi1uatrly t\\·o yc·arR after the oprration. Linda • 'park-
man was married to rf'sponde11t Lc•o Sparkman. lfpr inability 
to brconw pregnant led her to discover that she had bern 
stPrilizPd cluri ng tlw 1\171 oprration. As a rc·sult of this 
l'('Vrlation. tlw Rparkmans fikd suit in thC' rllitrcl Rtatc•s 
District Court for the Xorthcrn District of IIHiiana against 
nnd :1g:1 in,;f n 11 or :111~· 111:1 I I rr~ or c•:tll"<'" of :tc·t ion I h:il c·o11ld or miglu :t ri~r 
fl,; 11 rr,;nlt of thr prrforming of .-<aid Tnhill Lig:lfion . 
''T-:o-r wrr:-."'"'" \I' HEHWW , ,;aid :dliant. Orn ::-ipith•r ".\fC'F:1rlin , hn,; h<'rrllnfo 
su!J,;c·rihcd h<'r n:lllll' thi,; 9th d : 1~ · of .Jnl~·, 19il. 
"1~1 Ou.\ SPrrr.r-:u ".\f<'F.Iuu;o.; 
Or:t Spitl('r ".\lc·F:irlin 
Petitioner 
"Sub~rribrd :md .-1\'orn lo lH.forc• nw thi,; 9th da~ · nf .Tttl~ ·. Hlil . 
"/4 \r.\llHI·: :\ <:. :-\t' :-;D.IY 
\Yarn·n C. 811nd:1 .1' 
.Yo/Itt'!/ Public 
"}\f~ · eommj,;,;ion rxpit'<'~ .Tanua r~· -1 , Hliii. 
"T, IInrolcl D . ~lump, .lud::rt' of 1hc• D<·K:dll CirC"uit C'o11rt , dn hc•n·h.1· 
nppron• tlw :tho\·c· Pc·titiott h~ · :tflidn1·it form 011 h<·half of Or:t :-lpitlc•l' 
:.\fr'F:trlin , to h:t\'(' Tubal Lig-:tfion pc•rfornwd 11pon h<•r minot' d:tug-ht<•r, 
Lin<ht RpitJcor . ~uhjt•<·t . to ~:t id Or" Spitlcor \!1-'Farlin <·m·c•n:tnling- and 
ngr!'<>inp; to indenmif~· and kt•t•p indPmnifird Dr. .John lfitH':- :111d th<> 
J>PK:tlh 1f<•mori11l llo~pilnl from an~ · mal tc• r,; or !':til~!'~ oi' ac·tion ari.-illf!: 
therrfrom. 
" /:-:/ IJ.IJWTJ) n. RTlr ~II' 
Jwloe, DeKa/b C'irl'lril Coul'l 
"Dated July !), 1071" 
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Mrs. lVfcFarlin. lwr attornc•:v . .Jndgc• Stump. LIH• rlocton-: \\"ho 
had p0rfonn0rl and nssistc·d i11 tlH' tubal ligatio11. a11d the• 
DC' Kalb l\1C'll10rial TT ospi tal. n C'SjlOIHlc•ll ts ,;otq.!;h t damap:c•s 
for the alkgc•d Yiolation of Linda :-lpark1nan's e·olts!itiitional 
rights;~ nlso assc•rkd \\"ere• P<'IHI<'IIt st1:1tc• ('lai1ns for assrllllt 
and hatt0ry. 11wdical malpra<'ti<'e. and loss of pot<'lltinl 
fatherhood. 
Ruling upon tiH' <lrfc•uclants' various 111otions to dismiss thC' :;t;L 
complaint. th0 Distri<'t Court eoltcludC'd that C'a<'h of tlw 
constitutio11al claims ass<'rt<•d hy rC'S])OIHknts rc•quir!'d ash~- _:.., _ -'-~ ~ 
ing of sti_!ltC' action and that tlH• 01lly state• aetio11 allr!-!:<'d i11 ~-r, 
the compla1n t 'Q tlw apprO\·al hy .Judge• :-ltu1np. acting as ~.S 
circuit court judg;c•. of thv pe•tition pn•s<•ntPd to hin1 by ;\In;. 
McFarlin. Th0 Rparkmans sought to hold tlH• primte ddc•nd-~ 
.~ Tlw Di~fril'f C'ourf g:JI"<• flH• folloll'ing ~ltllltll:lr.'· of flu• c·on;<filtllion:JI 
rhim~ a~~rrfrd h~- th<' Sp:1rkm:Jn~: 
'·WhPf h('J' Li id lltHkr ,.:c•<·f ion u:3J 01' 1 :~-t:l (8 I nnd II'IH·f ht•r :J~~<·ri<-d A 
flil'r!'fl~- 01' l"i:l ~( • (•{ ion ] flS:) :1nd 1 flK.'i, ];J in f if'l'~ • gi'OIIItd~ for I'C'I'0\"('1'\" :n·p 
n~~rrfrd to rp~f on ilH' ,·iol;Jiion of c•on,..fifntion;d ril!hl'. l!.itJintifl', lll'''t-4_) 
1h<l-i-lll'i'I>1Hirlnfr· ~-iui.Jit~tl fliP folio" inl! 1 tlli.'litut-imtrrl ~·- PI:Jintifl'~ nnw 
ihlit drfrndant~ ,-ioi:Jil'd I he• folloll'ing c·on~tifnfional !l:II:Jl':Jnlc·<·~ : 
"l. fhaf 11H' :Jc·lion~ 1n•n• arl,itr:Jr~ - ;Jnd fhn~ in ,·iol:11ion ol' flw dnr 
prorr~~ c·latt~<' of flu• Fmtrll'c•nth .\nwrulmrnf: 
'·2. fhal Lind:t \\';r~ dPni!'d prot·c•dur:d . :al'!'gnnrd . : n·qt1in•d h~- lht· Fonr-
trrnf h Amt•ndnwnt: 
" !L thnf lhr ~fl'l'ilir.:Jiion 11 " :1~ ]l<'l'lllilf!'d ll'itltont ihc• promtdg;Jiion of 
F:f:Jil(i:JI'd.-: 
"4. fh;lf fhr .~1t•rilizalion 11':1~ :1n il\\·a~ion of pr'll-: 1< ' ~ ·: 
" .'5 . I hal lh<• . :f<'riliz;llion ,-iolait-d Lind;J·~ right to proc·rt •; JIP : 
"fl. I hal fiH• ~f('J'iliznfion W<~~ C'l'll<'l :rnd tllltl~tl:il pnni~lnnt·nl: 
"7. fhnl fltr n"r of ~lrrrlization :1~ Jntni~hnwrlf for lwr :iliPgt•d rPI:Jrd;Jtron 
or l:tr·k of .-<l'lf-di~riplinP l'iol;rl!'d \':Irion~ c •on~lilntion:rl l!li:tr:rnlt·P" : 
'·~. thai lh!' ckf('nd:tnt~ faiiPd fo follow t·t•riain Tndi:Jil:J ~I;Jfnlt·~. tlm-
dPpril·ing Lind:1 of dnr proc·<·~~ of l:1w: :ntd 
'·~. thaf, ddc•rHI:illf~ l'iolnft•d rill' t'ljll<rl proiPI'Iion t·bli~C', ht •t · an~c· of the \ 
diff!'n•nti;d f rf':rf nwnf :ll'c·ordt•d Lind;r on :H'c·otnlf of lu·r ~<'X. Ill : I rif:d ~t:Jin.-. 
and :ilkl!<'dly low lllC 'ntal c·;rp:IC'il_,· .'' Sjwrl.-1111111 , .. .lfi'Furli11 . ('il'll \•J . 
F i5--120 (XD Ind .• \[ay 1:), l!JiO) . 
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ants liable on a theory that tlwy had conspired with Jud!!;C' 
Stump to bring about thC' allC'gcdly UltCollstitutiollal acts. 
TlH' District Court. how<'\'('!', held that 110 f<'d<'ral action ,,·ould 
lie agai11st any of thC' rl0fendants lwcauS(' Judge Ntump. the 
only stat(' agent. was absolu tely imn1u1w from suit unl!Pr the 
doctrine of .i udicial immunity. Tlw court stat,ed that 
"whether or 110t Judge Stump's 'approval' uf thP pditio11 may 
in retrospect appear to have' ht)C'n pr<'tnisc'd 011 a11 C'ITOIIC'OllS 
view of the law. Judge Stump surely had jurisdietion to 
consider tlw p<'titio11 a11cl to act thereon. ' ' Spa.rlonnn v. 
McFarlin, Civil Ko. F 73- 120 (ND TtHI. May 1:3. 1070). 
Accordingly. under Bradley v. P·isher, 1:3 \\'all. :3:35.::351 (1R72) , 
Judge Stump was entitl('d to judicial immunity.~ 
On appc'al, thr Court of .Appeals for thA Seventh Circuit 
reversed the judgment of the District Court: holding that 
the "crucial issue" was "whether Judge Stump acted within. 
his jurisdiction ' ' and coneluding that he had not. ;)52 F. :2d, 
at 174. He was accordi11gly not immun<' fro111 drunag<'S liabil-
ity und0r the controlli11g authorities. ThP Court of Appt'als 
also held that the judge had forf<'ited his imtnu11ity "lwcaUS(! 
of his failure to comply \vith elrme11tary principles of proce-
dural due process." 552 F. 2cl, u,t 176. 
\\ye grantc'cl r<'rtiorari. - U. S. - ( Hl77) , to consicl0r 
the correctness of this ruling. \V e reverse. 
II 
The governing principle of law is wc11 <'Sta.blished ancl is 
not questioned by the partie's. As early as 1872. thP ( 'ourt 
t·ecognizcd that it was "a ge1wral principle of the high(•st 
importance to tlw proper administration of justic<' that a judi-
cial offic0r, in cxPrcising the authority vPstecl in him , lshould 'l 
3 Thr Di><! riel Court grant rd illf' ddrnd:wt."' ntol ion I o cJi,mi.,,- I hr· 
fCfkral cl:tim" for 111:11 J'(':l"on :tnd di"mi""rd lilt• n·nl:ttning [Wndr·rtl "tate 
claim" for lark of "uh.i•••·f 111:1fiPr juri"dit·lion. 
1 Sparkman v. Mcf?orlin , 552. F . 2d 17:2 (CA7 1977) . 
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be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprchf'ttsion 
of personal consequences to himself." Bradley \'. fi'1:sher, id. , 
at 347." For that rcasoll the Court held that "judg<'S of courts 
of supPrior or gc1tcral jurisdiction arc not liable to ci vii actions 
for their judicial acts, even when such acts arc i11 cxcPss of 
their jurisdiction. and arc alleged to have bPen doiH' mali-
ciously or corruptly.' ' "' ld., at 351. Later we held that this 
doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable in suits tmdN 
~ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 l'. S. C. ~ 1083, for 
the legislative record gave no inclicatio11 that Congress ill-
tended to abolish this long-established principle. J->iersnn Y. 
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (Hlfi7). 
The Court of Appeals correctly rf'cognized that the llf'Ces-
s::ry inCUJiry i11 determining whether a defenda11t. judge is 
immune from suit is whether at the time he took t.lw chal-
ler~cd actio n ]lQ_ had"' jur1s{"T'i'Cti on- over fh~5.wet mattPr 
~ -"""""t - .......... _.....'-" .... 
"En•n Pnrlirr. in Randall Y. Bri(lham. 7 Wnll. .')2:) (l l'li9) , 1hr C'om1 
~tniwl ihn1· judgc'"' arr not rr;<pon"'iblr " to priYnt(• p:trti('" in ('ivil :tdioll." for 
thrir judiri:tl n('b, howc·,·c·r injurio11"' n1a~ · hr tho"(' :tC'b, :tnd hm1·(·1·c·r rnuch 
tlw~· n111~· dr:<f'l'\'(' e·ontlrmn:t!ion, unit• ,;~ pNhap,- ll'iwn· lhl' :t('t,; :tl'l' palpabl~· 
in f'XN'"'" of tJH' juri"'dirtion of thc• judgl',;, ;tnd :tn' dol](' maJic·iun><l~ · 01' 
rorn1ptl~· . " Irl .. at 5:~7 . In !hadley the• Comt twon:<ickred tllilt P:trliPr 
Rt:lte.mrnt and c·on('lud!'d t h:t! " tlw qwtlit\ing word" 11~e·d \\ ' ('!'( ' not tH ' ('!':<;.;;II·~ · 
to a r·otTrci st':t l'rmPnt· of thP Ia w .. . . " 1 :~ \V:tll., :t I' :~.'\1 . 
"'ln holding ilut! :t judge· \\':"' inununc• for hi." judicial :tC'! .-< , c•vrn wlwn 
~mh nrts wr•rr JWrformPd in l'Xrl'o<." of hi :< juri,;diction, thP Coun in 
Bmdle•tJ "'1:\trd : 
"A di:<t inetion mu:<1 hr hrrc• oh,..rn·rd ])('t \\'C'f'n c•xel'~" of jmi,dicl ion and 
thn rkar nbsf'IH'(\ of ~til juri"'diC"tion ovc·r· lh1' "'uhjnl't .-matte•r. Wlu•n• thcrr 
i"' <'irm·]~· no juri,diclion ovc·r t lw ."ttbj('C't-m:ti tf'r :tn~ · authorit~ · l'X('l'ci~rd 
j,: :t u:<urprd authorit~· , and for the• PXPrf'i"'<' of :<ll('h :lltthorit~·. II'IH'n tlw 
want of jttri,..diction I" known 1 o t lw judge•, no c•xru"c' ;,. prnni"'"' ihiP. Hm 
whNr jmisdiclion on•r the suh.iP<'t-m<~ttrr i"' inn'"' tPd h~ · l:t\\' in I h(• JUdge•, 
or in thr romt whie·h he hole"'. thl' m:mnrr and c·xlpnt in whie·h tlw 
.imiodidion ."h:tll lw cwrri~(·d :m• gl'nc•r:tll~ · "" llltlch qttP,f'ion" for hi" 
dc•irrmin:ttion a~ :tn~· other (jill'"! ion" involwd in thP r:t:<l ', all hough upon 
tlw coJ'l'rr.tnc•"'" of hi" dctermin:ttion in thr~r jl : trti('ular~ tlu· y;tlidit .l· of hi." 
judgment" ma.1· dqwncl .'' Brrullc•rt Y. ZC.i~hc r, 1 :~ Wall. :~:{5 , ;).'}] - :).'):,! ll~7:!) . 
'J ·'~. 
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b0fore hi.m. B<•causC' "some' of llw most difficult a11(l <'lllhar• 
rassing queslions which a judicial officC'r is calkd upon to c:oll-
sidC'r and detf'rmine rc·lat<' to his jurisdiction ... ."' Bmdfey, 
s·upm, at :3i12. tJw sc:u H' o t I<' 'ud ·0's jurisdirtio11 Ill liSt ht• <:<111-
s .. trut•<l broadly whNC' tlw issue• is t w immunity o t w .Jlld~<'. 
A .i tHlge ~A'1il 11ot lw deprived of immu11ity because tlw aetio1\ 
he took was itl <'t-ror. was done ma.licious]y. or was in <'XC<'SS 
of his authority: rather. he will be subject. to liability 011ly 
wlwn. he has acted Ill the "clear absence' or all jurisdiction. 
Id., at ~~51. 
"\Vo cant1ot agret> that. thc•re was a "clt•ar· a.bs0neP of all 
jurisdiction" in tht• DcKalb County Circuit Comt to COitsid<·r· 
tlw prtiti011 preset1t<·d hy Mrs. McFarlitJ. :\~an fndiana, ( 'ir-
cuit c~ourt. judg<'. Judg£, Sturnp ~1 ''original excdusiY<~.itt_!j s~ 
diction i11 all cas<'s at law and in <•quity 11 hatscwv<·r ~ ,' ' 
.iurisclicti'(;; l over the settlellH'Ilt of (•States and OVPI' guardiatl-
sltips, appellate jurisdietion as conferred hy law. and jurisdie.-
tion over· "all otlwr causf's. matters and procPPdi11gs wiH·r<' 
exclusiv<' jurisdiction tlwrpof is not confl'rTt-d hy law upo11 
somf' othc•r court. board or officer." f1Hl. Cod<• ~ :~:i-4-4-:3 
(ln/3)." This is in<ked a broad jurisdictional grant; yc•t dH~ 
-:= - :!L. 
7 Tn IJJ'urlley. ilw Court illu .-lr:dr·d lht • di~linetion h·m<'<'ll l:id~ of 
jnri . :didion and <'X<'<''·" of ,it1ri.•didion wilh lh<· l'ollowinJ!: I'X:tmpl<·.- : if :1 
proh:lll' ,iwlp;r, 11·iih juri,:di<·lion o1·c·r onl.1· will . : :tnd r·,:l:tk- . .-hntild 11'1" :t 
rrimin:il r·:t.:< ·, lw 1nnild h<· :t<·ting in th<• l'iPar :th"<'ll<·<· of ,illl'i:-di!'litHt :111d 
\\'0\lld 1101 lJ1 • illlllliiiH· rrum Ji:d>iJit ,Y for hi,: ;l(·(inll: on JiH• othd' h:~lld. if ;t. 
jt11!g<' of :t r·rimin:tl t'OIII't ~hould <·or11·if'l :1 dcrr•Jid:Jnl of :t IHHH·xi.-tt·llt. ('f'iiiH' . 
ho wo11ld 111(' 1'('1~ · ilt' :ll'iinp; in <'xr·r·~~- of hi . : juri~didion :u1tl wotdd h< • 
itllHliiiH'. Jd .. :1t ::).)2. 
s f nd .. Code• § :~:l--1-.t-:~ ( Hli b) ,d :JI r .- a.- folloll'.- : 
'' .lmi.-dit·tion.- Snid r·ourl .-h:dl h:tl'<' origin:d <•Xf'lll.:in• jmi.-dit·tion i11 :til 
f' :l~l'" :11 lnw :11Jd in <'f)llii .' · ,,·hai,:ot•n •r, :tlld 111 crimin:d r·:1.:r •.• :t iHI :t<·lion.- ful ' 
rlinll'l'l ', I'XI'l'J!I Wht•n• I'Xt·hl .•il·(• Ill' t·OIIf'lll'l'l'lll jtlri,dir·lioll ],.: , <II' lll:t.1· Jw 
ronfrnNI h~ · 1:1\\' upon Jll ."lir·p,: of ih<· pr:tt'<'. Ti .-h:dl :il,:o h:ll·t· •·x•·hk'll'l' 
jllri,.rJil'tiOII of tJH , , t•lt!l'lllt'lli of dt•t•t •<kni,: ' t•.-cl:tlt •,: :t.flli of i.[ll:trdi:lli.'lllp~ : 
}Jrcn·ickd, holl'l'l·t•l', Th:tl in r·OIJIHic.- in which t·rimin:tl ur .• III)('T'Iot' <'11111'1 .-
rcxi~L Ol' m:1y be org;~nizcd, nothing in !hi,: ,.:(•cliou . :h:dl I)(' 1'111),.1 ntcd lv 
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Court of Appeals coneluded that Judge Stump did not havt· 
jurisdiction over the prtitio11 authorizing Linda ~parkman's 
sterilization. 
In so doing, the Court of Appeals notNl that tlw fndiana 
sta~es provided for the sterilization of institutionalized rwr~ 
sons under certain circumstances. sec l1Hl. Code~~ 10- 1:3- 1:-3- 1 
through 16- 13- 10-4 (1fl7:3). but otherwisr containc•d no ('X-
press authorit for judicia:l approval of tubal ligatTo 11S. ·It 
is true 1a t 1c statutory f!:Pant ~if ge11era .rurisdwt1on to the 
Ind.iamt circuit courts dors not itemize types of cases those 
courts may hear and hc' llC<' doc•s ·not expressly 111011tion strrili-
zation prtitions presentrd hy tho parents of a minor. But in 
our virw. it is morE' significant that there was no r ndiana 
statute and no casr law in lfl71 prohibiting a circuit court, 
a court of grneral jurisdiction. from considering a petition of 
the typr prC'scntc•cl to JuclgC' Stump. The statutory authority 
for the stC'rilization of insti tu tionaiizecl persons in the cu::;tody 
of the State) doc)s not warrant thr. inference that a court 
of general jurisdietion has no power to act on a pctiticm for 
sterilization of a minor in tlw custody of her parrnts. pa.r-
{
ticularly ·wlwr<' tlw parpnts have authority undf'r the ·lnclinna 
statute's to "consrnt to aii(f contract for nwdiraJ or hosp1fa1 
care or trcittmcnf oTTffic mmor I Jll rJ UcJ lllg surgrr ·" I nd. 
C'oclC' ~ 16- - 2 1973). "JC is ric (our concludC'd that 
Judge Stump had jUJ·isdiction undct· ~ 33- 4- 4- 3 to rntrrtain 
) an a.etien of Mrs. MeFarlin"s pctitio11. ·we agrr.c ·with the: 
District Court. it appearing that neither by statute or ease law 
has the broad jurisdictio1t granted to the circuit eourts of 
Indian~t been circumscribcrl Lo foreclose consideration of a 
petition for authorization of a nt.inor's strrilizatio11. 
clrprivr ~tlf'h ro ul'(~ of the .iuri,_dirfion ('onfrrr<'d upon tlwm h)· 1:111'" · :mel 
it shall ha,·r ~urh :tppellntr _iuri,.:dirliOJl ns lll:t)' lw <·nnfrn'('(l h~· l:t\\', :tnd 
it shnll b:lV<' jnri~<lif'fion of :til oflwr r:tu"r~, lll:lft,N., :111d pro<'<'(·ding.• \\'h('r<' 
r:wlu.,iw jnrisdit·f ion f hPI'l'of j, not <'OllfN rcd l>y hw UJlnn ~Oill<' oth<'r 
court, hoard or oiTi<'n." 
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The Court of Appeals also concluded that support for Judge 
Stump's actions could not be found in the common law of 
J ndiana. relying i u particular on the T ndiana Court of Appeals' 
intervening decision in A. L. v. G. R. H., 325 N. R 2d 501 
(1975). Tu that case the Indiana court held that a parent 
docs not have a common-law right to have a minor child 
sterilized. eveu though th0 parent might "sinc0n•ly b<>lieve 
the child's adulthood would benefit therefrom." !d. , at 502. 
The opinion , howevet·. SJwaks cmly of the rights of the part~nts 
to consent to tlw sterilization of their child a11d doc's not 
question the jurisdiction of a. circuit judge who is pr0sented 
·with such a petition from a pat·C'nt. Although UtHlC'r that case 
a circuit judge would err as a matter of law if he m'rc to 
approve a parent's petition seekillg tho st0rilization of a eh ild, 
the opinion in A. L. v. G. R. H. clo0s not indicate that a cir-
cuit .i udge is without .i urisdiction to entC'rtai n the petition. 
Jnclf'ed, the elrar implication of th0 opi n iou is that. wlwn pn'-
scntecl with such a p<'tition. thc circuit juclgC' should deny it 
on its merits rather than c1 ism issing it for lack of .i uriRdiction. 
Perhaps realizing the broad scope of Judg<' Stump's juris-
diction. tlw Court of App0als stat<•cl that. c•v<'n if tlw ac·tion 
taken by him was not for0closecl under tlw lnrliana statutory 
schenw. it would still be "an illegitimate exercisl' of his com-
mon law po\vrr lwcaus<' of his failur0 to comply with Pkmen-
ta.ry principles of procedural dtte process. ' ' 552 F. 2d . at 176. 
This misconc<'iws the doctrine of judicial immunity. A judge 
is absolutely immune from liability for his .i ucl icial art~ <'vcn 
if his excrcisc of authority is fiaw0d by thr commisBion of 
grave procecl ural errors. Tho Court made thiR poi 11t rlPar i 11 
Bradley, 13 \Vall.. at 357. ,,·here it stated that "this <'rrotwous 
manner in which I tlw court's I jurisdiction \\'as C'XC'rcisPd. ho\\·-
f'ver it may have affected tiH' validity of thC' act. did not make' 
the act any IC'ss a judicial act; nor did it ff'IHI<c•r tlw rkfC'tHl-
ant liable to atlS\wr in damag:('S for it at tlw suit of tlH' plain-
tiff. as though th<' court had proceeded " ·ithout having any 
jurisdiction 'vhatcvcr ..•• " 
7fl-17.10-0PTXJON 
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'Vr conclud0 that the' Court of Appeals. c•mploying nn 
undnly l'<'strietivC' vi<'w of tlw seopt' of Judge• Ntump's juris-
diction. l' rrE'd in holding t,ha~ he was not C'ntitiPd to judicia·! 
immunity. B0causc tlw court ov<'l' v.:hich .Judge' Ntump prP-
sicke is one of gerwral jurisdiction. rwither· tlw proc0dural 
error, l10 mR.y hav<> committed nor the lack of a sp0cific stat-
ute authorizi r1g hi s approval of tlw p<'ti tion i 11 q U<'stion rPn-
c.krc'cl him liab\0 in damag0s for Uw COllSN]liC'IICf'tS of his 
actions. 
Tlw rPsponcknts argn<' that Pvcn if Judge Stump had juris., 
diction to ccmsidrr tire pPtition prese'nte>d to him by Mrs. 
McFarlin, lw is still r1ot PrrtitlPd to judicial illlllHJnity lweauso 
his approval of tlw p0tition rlld not constitute' a " judicial' ' aet. 
Tt is only for arts pPrfomwd in his "j udieiaJ" e~apacity that a 
judge is absolutely immurw. they say. WP do rwt disagr'e'<' 
with this statemf'nt of tilt' law. hut wP eanrwt eharacterizt:l 
th<:> approval of tlw p<'ti tio11 as a nonj ud ieial art. 
Rcspondc'nts tlwmselv0s statPcl in thPil' pl0adings hefol'(• 
the District Court that J udgc Stump was "clotlwd with thP 
authority of the stat<•" at th<' tinw that lw approwd tlw pcti, 
tion a11d that " IH' was aetmg as a COLlllty circuit court judge'.'' 
Plaintiffs' Rc'ply Brid to the' Memorandum Filed 011 Bt•half of 
Harold D. Stump in Support of his Motion to Dismiss. at. (i. 
Tlwy llC'vC'rthC'lPss now argue' that .J udgt' :-I turn p 's approval of 
the petition was not R. judicial act hecaust' tlw petition was 
n.Qt gj~ a. doc;.!sPt llli1111Wr. was not plae<•d 011 file- with tfw 
clPrk 's offu'ie. nnd was a >IH'OVt'cl in an e.r parte prOC'Pt'd in~ 
·without notice to the mr11or. w1 10u a wanng, and without 
the appointnH'rlt of a guardian ad litem. 
This Court has not had occasion to co11si<kr. for purpose's of 
the judicial immunity doctrin0. tlw nccc>ssary attrihut<>s of a 
;judicial act: but it has prPviously rPjN•kd t.lw argurnt'nt. 
somewhat similar to tlw orH' raised h<'I'C'. that tlw lack of 
formality involwd in tlw lllinois ~UJH'<'JIH' Court's eo11sidera-
~ion of a p0titio11er's applicatiop for adrnissior1 to the stat<' l>av 
76-1750-0PHi'IO~ 
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lJrevented it from being a "judicial JWOC<)Pd i ng'' and from 
presf'nting a ease or controversy that could be revit>wed hy this 
Court. In re Summers, :325 1!. A. i'>61 (1045). Of partiC'uiJU' 
significance to the present case, the Court i11 Summers noted 
the following: "The record dews 110t show that any process 
issued or that any appearance was made. . . . 'Vhil<' no <'ntry 
was placed by the Clerk in the file, on a docket. or in a 
judgment roll. the Court took cognizance• of the petition and 
passed an order which is validated by the signatur<:' of tlw 
prPsiding officer." I d., at 5G7. Beca.usC' the Tllinois court took 
cognizance of the petition for admission and actPd upon it. the 
Court held that a casC' or controversy was presented. 
Similarly. thP Court of Appeals for tl1C' Fifth Circuit has 
held that a state district judge was entitled to judicial inunu-
nity. even though "at tlw tinw of the altercation [giving risC' 
to the suit] J udgP Brown ~·as not in his j udgf' 's robes. he was 
not in tlw courtroom itsplf. and lw may w·ell have• violated 
stat(• and / or feckral procedural requirements regarding con-
tC'mpt citations.'' McAlester v. Brown, 469 F. 2d 1280, 1282 
(C A5 1\172) .n Among the factors relied upon by the Court of 
Appeals in deciding that the judge was acting within his 
judicial capacity was thP fact that "the confro11tation arose 
dirC'ctly and immediately out of a visit to the judgr in his 
·official capacity." Ibid.10 
11 In McA/csli'J' the plaintiff~ nllrgNl th11t fJw~· had gonP to lhr rollt'thou~P 
whrrr thrit· ~ou wn,; In br tried h~· tlw defPndnnt in order to givl' the ~on 
n frr~h ~Pt or elothr,;. When thp~r went into the ddrnclnnt judge·~ ofllc•(' , 
]JC :tllegcdJ~,- ordPn•<l them out. and hnd a drpnt~· arre~t . nnr of them :llld 
pl:tee him in jnil for thl• reHt of the dn~·. Se\'t•nd monrh~ l:lfPr, thP j11d~i' 
i~"n<>d nn order holding thP pl:1intiff in contempt of rolll'l, 1W11r pro tu)lc. 
<<J Othf'l' C'omb of ApJW:tb, JH'C~Pntcd \\'ith different fact ~ift~ation", hnn• 
ronclnclccl t hn t t lw rh:dlrngl'd :let ion~ of ddc•ndnnt judgr~ wPrr not 
performed aR part of tlw judic·ial l'unc·tion :tnd that thP .it~dgc·,c wPrr thu~ 
not. rnlitle<l to rrl~· upon the doet rinr of judic·ial immnnit~·. Tlw Court of 
Appral~ for the Ninth Circuit, for cx:tmplc, hn,; held that a ju~tiee of the 
7ti-l /.'i0-01'1 :\1 ox 
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TIH' relevant eascs clcn1onst.ratt> that tiH' faetors ddPrlni11in~ 
whetl)('r an act hy a judi!;!' is a "judicial" OIH' rPlate to tlw 
nature of,..thc aet i ~f'lf. £. e .. ,,·hcther it is a function normally 
p'trforllled by a j7;'dg!'. and to the e•xpPetations of tlH' particH. 
1:. e., whctlwr they df'alt " ·ith tlw j udgc in his judicial capaei ty. 
Here. both factors indicatP that Judgc Stump's approval of the• 
sterilization pPti tion was a judicia 1 act. Statc .i udgPs with 
gpneral jurisdiction not. infrPquPntly an• calkd upon in thf'ir 
official capacity to ap]n·ove• ]Wtitions rc•latin~~: to tlw affairs of 
minors, as for Pxamplf'. a pPtition to sl'ttk a mi11or's elaitn. 
Furthcr·mor<'. as cven respondents hav<' admittt'd. at tlw tilllP 
he approved thf' pctition prl'Sf'll ted to him by Mrs . .Vle.Farl i 11. 
Judge Stump was "acti1tp: as a county eircuit court judge." 
R<•f'. supra, at *-· We• 1nay infer from tlw rccord that it was 
only because Judge Rtump scrved in that position that Mrs. 
McFarlin. on tlw ad,·ic<' of counsel. submittf'd thc pPtition to 
him for his approval. B!'causc Juclgc Stump p<'rfornJcd tlw 
typc of act normally pcrfor1nf'd only by judges a11d lwcausc lw 
did so in his capacity as a circuit court judg<'. Wf' find no nwrit 
to r<'spond<'nts' argum<'llt that tlw infonnality with whieh lw 
proc<'cdcd r<'lHI!•rNI his aetion nonjudicial and ckpriv<'d hi111 
of his absolute irmnunity. 
Both tlw Court of .\p]wals ancl thP n•spondcnts s<'e'm lo 
suggcst that. lwcaus<' of the tragic eonscqucn<'!'S of Judge· 
]W:tr<• who \\':t,.. :tt·<·ll:.:('([ of fon· ihl~· l'<'lllOYing :1 lll:1n from hi~ <·Otll'lroont 
and ph~· :.:i(':dl .' · a~sn11lting him 11':1:.: not :th:.:olulrl~ · immunt•. Ureoory 1·. 
Thomp.ww. 500 F . :!d .'i~) (19/.f) . vYhiiP tit!' ('()tll'l J'( '('Ogni~t·d lh:il :1 judgt• 
h:t~ thr dut~ · lo maint :tin ord<'r in hi:.: <"Onrtroom . i1 <·on<"luded th:1t llw 
ll<'lnal Pvi<"iion of :.:omeoru• from thr conrtroom ~~~ · n:<<' of ph, ·:.:w:tl for('! ', 
:1 la:.:k norm:tll~ · J)('rlomwd b~ · :1 sh<·riff or h:tilifT, w:t." ":.:impl.1· not an :ll't 
of :1 jndi<'i:tl natnn•." !d .. :II H.f . . \nd llw C'onrl of App<'al.• for tht• ~ixth 
Cir('uil h<"ld in /,y/l('h , .. ./oh11s011 . .f:!O F. :!d ~IN (Hl/0). lh:1t thl' <'OIIIII~ · 
jndw• :.:11<•rl in that. <':t :< <' \\'a .• nol <'nlitll'd to jltdi<·ial llltllltlllit~ · hr ·< · :tll~<· hi :.: 
,.:(•n ·ir<• on a board with only lt•gi :.: l:dii'P and admini :.: tratin• powPr:.: did not 
con:.:titutP a jndi('i :d act. 
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Stump's actions, he !:lhould not ])(' irnmurr<'. For c•xarnpl<' , 
tlw Court of Appeals notNl that "It] hrrc• are a<"tion!:l of 
purport{'( I .i udicial eharactrr that a j udgr. rvrn wlwn rxrr-
cising grnC'ral jurisdiction, is not ernpow0red to take. " .)5:2 F. 
2d, at 176. and rrsponden ts argue that J udgc• Sturn p 's action 
was "so unfair' ' and "so lkvoid of judicial concPrn for thr 
interests and Wt'll-being of the young girl ir1\'olv0d' ' as to 
disqualify it as a judicial act. Brief for R<>sporHlrnts lR. 
Disagreement with the action taken by the judge. how<>vt•r. 
does not justify dc•]wiving that judge of his immunity. D(•spitP 
the unfairness to litigants that somctinws results. tlw doetl'inr 
of judicial immunity is thought to lw in the lwst intcr0sts of 
"the proper administration of .i usticr . . . 1. for it allows I a 
judicial officrr. in rxPrcising the authority vest('(l in him I to I 
lw free to act upon his own convictions. without apprPlwnsion 
of prrsonal consrqurnccs to himself." Bmdley ''· F·isher. 1:3 
Wall.. at :34 7. The fact that thr issut' ])('fore tlw .i udgc is a 
controversial one is all the more reason that he should lw ahk 
to act without fpar of suit. As tlw Court pointed out in 
Bradley: 
"ControversiPs i11volving 110t mcrPly gr0at pc•c·uniary in-
tNf'sts. hut the liherty and charactPr of thl' partiPs. and 
co11sequ0ntly Pxciting the• clf'epest fpelings. are bPing 
constantly dPtcrmined in thos<' courts. in which thc:r<' is 
grl'at conflict in tlw evidence and great doubt as to thP 
law which should gov0r11 tlwir ckcision. lt is this elass of 
cases which impose upon tlw judg<' the scverPst labor. arHI 
often crrate in his mind a painful sc•rrsr of responsihility.'' 
!d. , at 34R. 
The Indiana law vested in Judge Stump the powrr to 
entertain and act upon thr petition for sterilization. Hc• is. 
thereforE'. undPr the: controlling cas<'s. immune from damages 
liability cvrn if his approval of thr prtition was in error. 
Accordingly. thr judgment of thr Court of AppPals is revrrsc'd 
iG-II•:i0-0 1'1 Xl0N 
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and tlw eas<' is n•maJl(l<•d for further proC<'l'dings <'onsistl'llt 
with this opinio11,11 
It 'is so ordered. 
Mn. Jn;TJC'E BBI-:NKAS took 110 part in th<' cousid<·ratio11 or 
decision of this case. 
11 Th<· i~.~11r i:< noi pr<'~r·nkd and wr' do not drr·id<' ll'llC'IIwr I h<' Di~lrir·l· 
Court ron·< ·<'11~· <·on<·lurkd I hal. thl' f•<'<kra.l d;1im~ <I~Hin.-i i h<' other 
dPI'r•Jl(bnl:< \\·r·t·r n•q1tirrd to he di,nti.""<'d if .lt1<lp:l' ::-;tump, 1]1(' on]~· 
dei'<·ndanl <1ding nnd<'t' <·olor of .-1:11<' l<~w, \\'<1" follllrl to IH· ab"olul<·ly 
irnmnnr. ColllJl:!l'l' 1\n·mit ('011811'. Co. \'. lJa:nl'O ('redito r Alwl'!'() 
Ponr't'lw. :).J.7 F. :Zd J. (CA.! W7H) , wil h 0 ue:dry , .. fiord , .J.:l.l F. :.!d liliO 
(CA5 1U70) . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~gtrculated: 
No. 76-1750 
Harold D. Stump et al., Petitioners,! On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. . the United States 
Linda Kay Sparkman and Court of Appeals for 
Leo Sparkman. the Seventh Circuit. 
[March -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE Sn}WAR.T, dissenting. 
It is established federal la.w that judges of general jurisdic-
tion are absolutely immune from monetary liability "for 
judicial acts, even when such acts a.re in excess of their juris-
diction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or 
corruptly.'' Br.adley v. Fisher, 80 Wall. 335, 351. It is also 
established that this immunity is in no way diminished in a 
proceeding under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U. S. 547. But the scope of judicial immunity is limited to 
liability for "judicial acts," and I think that what Judge Stump 
did on July 9, 1971, was beyond the pale of anything that 
could sensibly be called a judicial act. 
Neither in Bradley v. Fisher nor in Pierson v. Ray was there 
ally claim that the conduct in question was not a judicial act, 
and the Court thus had no occasion in either case to discuss· 
the meaning of that term.1 Yet the proposition that judicial' 
immunity extends only to liability for "judicial acts" was 
emphasized no less than seven times in Mr. Justice Fields' 
opinion for the Court in the Bradley case.2 Cf. Imbler v .. 
Pa.chtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430. And if the limitations inherent 
1 In the Bradley ca ~e thP plaintiff was a lawyer who had been diHbarred; 
in the Pierson case the plaintiffs had been found guilty after a. criminar 
"&rial. 
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in that concept have any realistic meaning at all, then I 
cannot believe that the action of Juqge Stump in approving 
Mrs. McFarlin's petition is protected by judicial immunity. 
The Court finds two reasons for holding that Judge Stump's 
approval of the sterilization petition was a judicial act. First, 
the Court says, it was "a function norma.Ily performed by a 
judge." Second, the Court says. the act was pedormed in 
Judge Stump's ".i udicial capacity.'' With all respect, I think 
that the first of these grounds is factually untrue and that the 
second is legally unsound. 
When the Court says that what Judge Stump did was an 
act "normally performed by a judge," it is not clear to me 
whether the Court means that a judge "normally" is asked to 
approve a mother's decision to have her child given surgical 
treatment geuera.lly, or that a judge "normally" is asked to 
approve a mother's wish to have her daughter sterilized. But 
whichever way the Court's statement is to be taken, it is 
factually inaccurate. In Indiana, as elsewhere in 01Jr country, 
a parent is authorized to arrange for and consent to medical 
and surgical treatment of his minor child. Ind. Code § 16-8-
4-2 (1973). And when a parent decides to call a physician to 
care for his sick child or arranges to have a surgeon remove his 
child's tonsils, he does not, "normally" or otherwise. ueed to 
seek the approval of a judge.u On the other hand, Indiana 
n This general authority of a parent was held by an Indiana Court of 
Appe!lls in 1975 not to include the power to authorize the sterilization of 
his minor child. A. L. v. G. R. H .. 325 N. E. 2d 501. 
Contrnry I o tlw Court':,; conclusion, ante, at 9, that case does not in the 
lea:sl. d0mon~tratr thnt. an Indiana judge is or ev0r was empowered to act 
on the merits of a. p0tition likP Mr:s. McFarlin's. ThE> parE-nt in that cnse 
d1d not prtition for judicial approval of h0r decision, but rathE-r "filrd a 
complaint for dPclarator~· judgm0nt sP<>king dPclaration of hrr right under 
the common-law attribul<'s of thr parPnt-rhild rel:~tionship to ha.ve her 
Ron . . . stE-rilized ." Ibid . The Indiana Court of Appeal::;' decision simply 
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did in 1971 have statutory procedures for the sterilization of 
certain people who were ·institutionalized. But these statutes 
provided for administrative proceedings before a board estab-
lished by the superintendent of each public hospital. Only if, 
after notice and an evidentiary hearing, an order of steriliza-
tion was entered in these proceedings could there be review in 
a circuit court. See Ind. Code §§ 16--13--13--1 through 16-13-
13-4 (1973).4 
In sum, what Judge Stump did on July 9, 1971, was in no 
way an act "normally performed by a .i udge." Indeed, there 
is no reason to believe that such an act has ever been performed 
by any other Indiana judge, either before or since. 
When the Court says that Judge Stump was acting in "his 
judicial capacity" in approving Mrs. McFarlin's petition. it is 
not clear to me whether the Court mea11s that Mrs. McFarlin 
submitted the petition to him only because he was a judge. or 
that, in approving it, he said that he was acting as a judge. 
But however the Court's test is to be understood, it is, I think, 
demonstrably unsound. 
It can safely be assumed that the Court is correct in 
concluding that Mrs. McFarlin came to Judge Stump with her 
petition because he was a county circuit court ju.dge. But false 
illusions as to a judge's power can hardly con vert a judge's 
response to those illusious into a judicial act. In short, a 
judge's approval of a mother's petition to lock her daughter in 
the attic would hardly be a judicial act simply because the 
sauctioned nor contemplated any procedure for judicial "approval " of the 
pnrPnt'~ decision. 
Indeed, the procedure followPd in that rase offers an instructive rontnvt. 
io the judiria.l conduct. a.t i:>>'ue here : 
"At the out~:~et. , W(' thank c01m,;el for their excellent efforts in repre~Pnting· 
a seriously concenwd parent and in providing the guardian ad litem dd(•n::;o 
•.of the child's intere;;t." :325 . E. 2d, at 502. 
4 'Th5':;e stR.tute"' were repealed in19'Z 4. 
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mother had submitted her petition to the judge in his official 
capacity. 
If, on the other hand, the Court's test depends l.lpon the 
fact that Judge Stump said he was acting in his judiciai 
capacity, it is equally ipvalid. It is true that Judge Stump 
affixed his signature to the approval of the petition as "Judge, 
De Kalb Circuit Court." But the conduct of a· judge surely 
does not become a .iudicial act merely on his own say-so. A 
judge is not free. like a loose can11011, to inflict indiscriminate 
damage whetwver he announces that he is acting in his 
judicial capacity." 
If the standard adopted by the Court is invalid. then what 
is the proper measure of a judicial act? Contrary to implica-
tions in the Court's opinion, my conclusion th~tt what Judge 
Stump did was not a judicial act is not based upon the fact 
that he acted with infonnality. or that he may -pot have been 
"in his judge's robes,'' or "in the courtroom itself:" Ante, 
p. 11. And I do not reach this conclusion simply "because the 
petition was not given a docket nu111ber, was not placed on file 
with the clerks office, and was approved in an ex parte pro-
ceeding without notice to the minor, without a hearing, and 
without the appointment of a guardian ad litem." Ante, p. 10. 
It seems to me. rather, that the concept of what is a judicial 
act must take its content from a con~ideration of the factors 
that support immunity from liability for the p~rformance of 
" Believing that the conduct of Judge Stump on July 9, 1971, was not a 
judicial art, I do not nerd to inquire whether he was acting in " the clear 
absen<'e of all juri~diction ovrr the subjrrt matter." Bradley v. Fi$her, 
13 Wall., nt 351. ·'Jmisdiction" is a coat. of many colors. I note only 
that the Court':< finding that .ludge Stump had juri~diction to entertStin 
1\.Jr:<. :VIcFarlin ';; petition ,.,'('rms to me to be b~sed upon dangerously broad 
criteria. Tho:<<' critrria are ~imply that. Hll Indiana statute conferred 
" jurisdictiou of all . . . ca u~es, matters and procPrdings," and th11t. there 
wa:; not in 1971 any Indiana law :specifically prohipiting what Judge Stump 
-did. 
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such ~tn l'tct. Those factors were accurately summarized by 
thf! Court in Pierson v. R(Jy 1 386 U.S. 5i-7, at 554: 
"{I] t ~~s ... for the benefit of the public, whose interest 
it is that the judge& should be at liberty to exercise their 
functions with indep~ndence and withouf fear of conse-
quences'. . . . It is a judge's duty to clecide all cf\'Ses 
within his jurisdiction that are bro\lght before him, 
including controver~ial Cf\.Ses that arouse tpe most intense 
feelings i11 the litigf\nts. His errors may be correctecl on 
~tppe~tl, but qe should not have to fear that unsatisfied 
Utiga.nts may hound him with liti~ation charging malice 
or corruption. Imposing such a burden on juqges would 
contribu'te 11ot to principled ancl fearless decision-makiqg 
but tA intiiTJ.idation." ' 
Not one of the conrsiqerations thus summ{trizecl in. the 
Pierson opin!pn was present here. There was no ''9~trse," cop-
troversial or ' otherwise. There were no litig~tnts. There was 
and could be no appef~.l. And there Wfi.S not even the pretext 
of principled cleoisiompaking. The total absence of any of 
these norma~ ~tttributes of a judicial proceeding convinces me 
thfl.t the conduct cornp~ainf!d of in tpis case was not a judicial 
act. 
The peti'tioners' brief speaks of 1'an aura of deism 'which 
s~rrounds the bench ... e~sential to the maintenance of 
respect for the judicial ipstitution." Though the rhetoric may 
be overblown, I do not quarreJ with it. But if a.urtt there be, 
it is hardly protected by exbn.era.ting from liability such lawless 
conduct &s took place here. And if intimicfatior WOl.Jld &erve 
to deter its recurrence, that woulcl ~urely be in the public 
interest.6 
(! Th!l only question before us in this case is the scop\l of judicia! 
immunity. How the absence of a "judicial act" might affect the issue of 
whether Judge Stump was acting "under color pf" state law within the 
meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, or the issue of whether his a.ct was that of 
the St11te within the meaning of the Fourteenth. AJPendmept, 11re, therefore, 
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PLEASE RETURN-
tst DRAFT TO FILE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 76-1750 
Harold D. Stump et al., Petitioners,) On Writ of Certiorari to. 
v. the United States: 
Linda Kay Sparkman and Court of Appeals for 
Leo Spa.rkman. the Seventh Circuit. 
[March -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
While I join the opinion of MR. JusTICE STEWART, I wish to 
E:'mphasize what I take' to be the central feature of this case-
petitioner's preclusion of any possibility for the vindication of 
respondent's rights elsewhere in the judicial system. 
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 WaH. 335 (1872), which established 
the absolute judicial immunity at issue in this case. recognized 
that the immunity was designed to further the public interest 
in an independent judiciary, sometimes at the expense of 
legitimate individual grievances. !d., at 349; accord, Pi£rson 
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,554 (1967). The Bradley Court accepted 
those costs to aggrieved individuals because the judicial system 
itself provided other means for protecting individual rights: 
"Against the co11sequences of [judges'] erroneous or irreg-
ular action , from whatever motives proceeding, the law 
has provided for private parties numerous remedies, and 
to those remedies they must, in such cases, resort." 
Bradley, supra, at 354. 
Underlying the Bradley immunity, theu. is the notion that 
private rights can be sacrificed in some degree to the achieve-
ment of the greater public good deriving from a completely 
independent judiciary, because there exist alternative forums 
and methods for vindicating those rights. 1 
1 Sre HandlPr & !(IPiil . The DrfPUI>P of PrivilPgP in DefAmation Suits 
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But where a judicial officer acts in a manner that precludes 
all resort to appellate or other judicial remedies that otherwise 
would be available, the underlying assumption of the Bradley 
doctrine is inoperative. See Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554.2 
In this case, as MR. JusTICE STEWART points out. ante, at 5, 
petitioner's unjudicial conduct insured that "[t]here was and 
could be no appeal." The complete absence of normal judicial 
process foreclosed resort to any of the "numerous remedies" 
that "the law has provided for private parties." Bradley, 
supra, at 354. 
In sum, I agree with MR. JusTICE STEWART that respondent's 
actions were not "judicial," and that he is entitled to no 
judicial immunity from suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 
Against. Government Executive Officials, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 44, 53-55 
(1960); .Jaffr, Suit!; Against Govrrnment:s and Officers: Damage Actions, 
7i Harv. L. Rev. 200, 23a-235 (196:3); Note, Federal Executivr Immunity 
l<rom Civil Liability in Damnge.s: A Reevaluation of BaiT v. Mateo, 77 
Colum. L. Hev. 625,647 (1977). 
2 In both Bradle!J and Pierson n.ny ·errot'IS committed by the judg<.'8 
jnvolved were open to correction on a.ppeaL 
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Upheld in Indiana 
Sterilization Case 
By Morton Mintz 
Washington Post Staff Writer 
The Supreme Court ruled 5 to 
3 yesterday that an Indiana judge 
who approved the sterilization of 
a 15-year·old girl without her 
knowledge or consent performed 
a "judicial act" and consequently 
was absolutely immune from being 
sued for damages. 
The dissenters accused the majority 
of relying on a "factually untru~" def-
inition of a judicial act and of wrap-
ping immunity around "lawless con-
duct." The majority rejected the accu-
sations. 
The intensity of feelings evoked 
among the justices became obvious in 
the hushed chamber of the court after 
Justice Byron R. White brieflY sum-
marized the 15-page opinion he wrote 
for the majority. 
NormallY, that would have ended 
the matter. In recent years, dissenters 
only infrequently have given opinions 
from the bench. 
Yesterday, however, Justice Potter 
Stewart read aloud most of his five-
page dissent, in which he was joined 
by Justices Thurgood Marshall and 
Lewis F. Powell Jr. 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, one 
of the majority, was at Stewart's right 
as the dissenter spoke in a strong, 
controlled voice. As one cutting 
phrase tumbled on another, Burger's 
face reddened. Other justices also ap-
peared to be uncomfortable. The ten-
sion struck observers as almost Palpa· 
ble. 
The decision is one of a verY few on 
judicial immunity, which is intended 
to assure that a judge will act inde· 
pendently, without fear of personal 
consequences, even if occasionallY at 
the expense of legitimate individual 
grievances. 
In a milestone ruling in 1872, the 
court held judges absolutely immune 
from monetary liability "for judicial 
acts, even when such acts are in ex-
cess of their jurisdiction, and are al· 
See COURT, AS, Col. 5 
_, 
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Judges~ Total Immunity 
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leged to have been done maliciously 
or corruptly." 
The act in question in yesterday's 
case was done by an elected judge in 
his 20th year on the 'bench, Harold D. 
Stump of DeKalb County in north-
west Indiana. 
In 1971, Warren G. Sunday, .a law-
yer, presented him with a petition 
from Ora McFarlin for approval of a 
tubal ligation to be performed upon 
her daughter, Linda, then 15, in "the 
best interest" of the child. 
Linda ''is considered to be · some· 
what retarded, although she is attend· 
ing or has attended the public 
schools," McFarlin swore. In addition, 
Linda, on "several occasions," had 
spent the night with young men. 
Stump approved the petition with· 
out notice to Linda, without a· hear-
1 ing, without the appointment of a 
, guardian for her interests and without 
leaving a public record. He signed the 
paper as "Judge, DeKalb Circuit 
Court." 
Six days later, Linda entered De· 
Kalb Memorial Hospital, having been 
told that her appendix would be re-
moved. In fact, Dr. John Hines per-
formed both an appendectomy and a 
sterilization. Both the physician and 
the hospital had been relieved of lia-
bility by the petition approved 'by the 
judge. 
Two years later, in 1973, Linda mar-
ried Leo Sparkman. Her inability to 
become pregnant led her to the dis-
covery that she was sterile. Invoking a 
· Reconstrur:tion-era civil rights law. 
protesting loss of potential father· 
hood, sought an additional $500,000. 
The . defendants included McFarlin, 
her lawyer, the physician, the hospital 
and Stump. The Supreme Court left it 
to lower federal courts to decide 
whether its immunization of the judge 
requires dismissal of the other defen-
dants. 
A federal judge ruled for Stump, 
but was reversed by the 7th U.S. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. It said Stump 
had not acted "within his jurisdiction" 
and had forfeited immunity by disre-
garding "elementary principles of due 
process." 
To validate his conduct would be to 
sanction "tyranny from the bench," 
the appeals court said. Bu.t the Su-
preme Court overturned the appeals 
tribunal, saying that under Indiana 
law Stump's approval of the steriliza-
tion petition was a judicial act-"a 
function normally performed by a 
judge." 
In dissenting, Stewart said that a 
judge's conduct does not become 
"judicial" merely because he says it 
is. "A judge is not free, like a loose 
cannon, to inflict indiscriminate dam-
age whenever he announces he is act-
ing in his judicial capacity," he said. 
He said that it was "factually un-
true" that Stump's act was one 
"normally performed by a judge," not· 
ing that no other Indiana judge ever 
has dove it, and terming it "beyond 
the pale . . ." For the court, White 
rioted that Stewart didn't "dispute 
that judges normally entertain peti· 
tions with respect to the affairs of mi· 
nors." 
Stewart found a "total absence of 
any of the normal attributes of a judi· 
cial proceeding" cited by the court iD 
1967. "There was no 'case' ... no Uti· 
gants," he said. "There was and could 
be no appeal. And there was not even 
the pretext of principled decision· 
making. 
In reply, White said, "Courts and 
judges often act ex parte-with only 
one party represented. 
In addition to the chief justice, the 
justices who joined White were Harry 
A. Blackmun, William H. Rehnquist 
and John Paul Stevens. Justice- Wil· 
liam J. Brennan Jr., ill when the case 
was considered, did not participate. 
... . - ... 
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Om . ~~ nzpotence 
L JKE OTHER PUBLIC officials, judges need to be immune from the suit. What he did was a ''judicial protected from angry losers. That's why the Su- act," the court says, because signing the petition is an 
preme Court a hundred years ago established the act normally undertaken ~Y a judge, and the parties -
doctrine that judges are immune from damage suits were dealing with him as a judge. He would not be 
based on claims that their judicial acts have wrongly immune, the court said, only if he clearly lacked ju-
harmed someone. Judges would not feel free to make risdiction over the petition. He had jurisdiction, it ex-
principled or unpopular decisions in controversial plained, because Indiana law gave him broad, general 
cases if losers could hound them with litigation power and did not specifically bar him from handling 
charging malice or ·corruption. But the Supreme such matters. 
Court this week carried the doctrine too far in the For the reasons set out eloquently by Justice Potter 
·case of a young woman who was sterilized after what Stewart in dissent and quoted on this page For the 
was, at best, a kangaroo-court proceeding. Its decision Record, we think the court's logic is defective. It per-
grants unchecked power to judges to act secretly, mits judges to abuse their power without fear of re-
conspiratorially and even illegally without fear of dress. Just recently, a judge in New York ordered the 
being sued for damages; they need only invoke the immediate arrest of a street vendor who had sold his 
right of judicial trappings. . bailiff a cup of coffee the judge did not like. That, 
Consider the facts of this case. In 1971, an Indiana under the court's formula, was a "judicial" act. But 
woman presented to a local judge a petition to have even that, as gross as it may have been, was quite dif-
her 15-year-old daughter sterilized. The mother stated ferent in character. The vendor, in theory at least, 
under oath that the girl was ·~somewhat retarded" (al- could get a judge of a higher court to set him free. 
though she had been promoted with her class in, The girl who was sterilized had no opportunity to ap-
school each year), that she associated with older men peal to a higher court and no way to change the per-
and had stayed overnight with them on several occa- manent effect of that "judicial" order on her life. 
sions, and that sterilization would be in her best inter- AB Justice Lewis Powell pointed out in his dissent, 
ests "to prevent unfortunate circumstances." The the court simply ignored. the basic reason why _a na· 
judge signed the petition-without notifying the girl tion can run the risk pf granting its judges a certain 
or appointing a lawyer to represent her or holding a immunity. It is that their acts as judges are, almost 
hearing or filing the petition in his court. He acted, without exception, subject to review before they ere-
what is more, without any specific grant of power ate permanent damage. A single judge, acting wrong- , 
•. under Indiana law. A week later, the girl was sterilized fully or spitefully or illegally, can harm you tempo- ' 
at the same time her appendix was removed. Some rarily in many ways. But he should never have unUm-
years later, after she was married, she discovered ited power to make that harm permanent on his 
what had been done and sued the judge, her mother, word alone. That blatant immunity is what the court 
her mother's lawyer and the doctors for damages. has granted. It is a deeply disturbing step toward ju-
The Supreme Court ruled, 5 to 3, that the judge is dicial omnipotence. 
